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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SYSTEM CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Appellant,
vs.
SHIRLEY M. DIXON, an individual,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 18034

--~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~>

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant
inter alia,

has proceeded against Respondent

requesting,

preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining and

prohibiting Respondent from continuing employment with MetroData, a
non-Utah corporation, or providing services to MetroData in connection with the design, development, manufacture, display, exhibition,
sale or other promotion of the competing products of MetroData.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court,

Dee,

Judge,

denied

Appellant's Motion for preliminary injunction.
RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Order denying

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant's Motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and MetroData compete with each other in the
manufacture and sale to the cable television industry of sophisticated equipment known as character generators. (Transcript at 7-11,
15, 30; Record at 48, 53-54.)

The cable television industry is in

its infancy and thus has relatively few potential customers spread
over a market area of the continental United States, Alaska and
Hawaii. (Transcript at 23.)
On or about May 15, 1978, Appellant employed Respondent
(Transcript at 22, 38, Exh. 9; Record at 53-54)

who worked as

Appellant's sales coordinator and Appellant's national sales manager
for the cable television market.

(Transcript at 22, 38, 40.) In

her work, she became knowledgeable and familiar with Appellant's
products, sales methods and customers.
25-28, 38, 44.) •
design

(Transcript at 15-18, 22-23,

Respondent also was involved in the operational

specifications

and

technical development

of Appellant's

multi-channel character generator and other products and had access
to proprietary information.

(Transcript at 15-18, 39-40, Exh. 10;

Record at 48.) Respondent also became the recipient and object of
Appellant's good will

through her

interaction with Appellant's

customers (Transcript at 25-27) and as a result of extensive promotional activities and advertising by Appellant designed to create
good will in or though Respondent so that she could be more effective in the sale of Appellant's products. (Transcript at 27-28, 46,
Exh. 13.).
In order to protect its good will and to prevent com-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

petitors from acquiring, appropriating or discovering the distinctive characteristics and design features of Appellant's products and
to maintain and protect Appellant's competitive advantage of its
products in the industry (Record at
employees,
proprietary

in

connection

information

with

and

48), Appellant requires all

their

employment,

restrictive

employment

to

sign

a

agreement.

(Transcript at 11-13.) •

After commencing employment on May 15,

1978,

such

Respondent

signed

(hereinafter "Agreement").
at 48, 53-54.)

an agreement on January 11, 1979

(Exh. 9; Transcript at 12-13, 38; Record

Respondent's employment was terminable at the will

of either party, and she executed the Agreement in consideration of
continued employment with Appellant.

At approximately the same

time, Respondent also received a promotion and raise.
at 42-43, Exh. 12.)

(Transcript

The lower Court specifically found that there

existed adequate compensation and consideration for Respondent's
execution of the Agreement.
Respondent's

(Transcript at 43-44.)

Agreement

prohibits

her

from

disclosing

proprietary and confidential information concerning Appellant's products and marketing programs and from rendering services to any competitior ("Conflicting Organization" in the Agreement) within two
years

fro~

the date of termination of employment with Appellant,

except under certain conditions which have not been met in this case.
(Record at 53-54 ~)

Respondent's Agreement further provides that

in the event of breach of
Appellant's

its terms and conditions by Respondent,

rights under the Agreement can be enforced by injunc-

tion. (Transcript at 37, Exh. 9.)
During March of 1981, Respondent voluntarily terminated her
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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employment with Appellant and, notwithstanding the Agreement, became
and

is

employed

by MetroData

as

its

national

sales

manager.

(Transcript at 29; Record at 48, 53-54.) In such position she is
able to

(Transcript at 44-45)

and has competed for Appellant's

customers on behalf of MetroData and unfairly deprived Appellant of
the benefit of its good will created in or through Respondent and
also of the results of its time, effort and expense incurred in
developing, manufacturing and selling its products. (Transcript at
29.)
Following Respondent's employment at MetroData, Appellant
commenced this action against both Respondent and MetroData in an
effort to restrain such employment relationship and to recover such
damages as it had incurred and would incur as a result of breach of
the Agreement by Respondent and interference with the Agreement by
MetroData.
nary

(Record at 2-10.) Subsequent to denial of the prelimi-

injunction,

Defendant

MetroData

moved

for

and

obtained

dismissal of the action as against it on the basis of lack of jurisdiction in Utah.

Appellant has not appealed that order, and litiga-

tion with Metrodata is in process in the State of California.
Appellant initially obtained a temporary restraining order
against Respondent's employment with MetroData, which temporary
restraining order was continued for a second ten day period because
Appellant was unable to affect service of process upon Respondent.
(Record at 12-20.) Such extension

expir~d

prior to obtaining service

of process, however, and Appellant then moved the lower court for a
preliminary

injunction

after

service

of process

was

obtained.

(Record at 29-30.) After a hearing on Appellant's motion for a pre-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

liminary injunction, at which Appellant was allowed but one hour and
fifteen minutes to present its evidence and argument,

the lower

court denied Appellant's motion and entered the Order appealed from.
(Record at 58.)

The lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law are contained in the Record at 53-54.
Upon petition of Appellant (Record at 60-75) and Answer of
Respondent (Record at 76-79), this Court granted Appellant's petition for interlocutory appeal of the lower court's Order on November
13, 1981.

(Record at 59.)
ARGUMENT

I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN THIS ACTION IS PROPERLY ENFORCEABLE
BY EQUITABLE-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
Whila there are other cases supporting such proposition,
Allen v.

~

(hereinafter

Park Pharmacy, 120

"~

u.

2d 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951)

Park"), is the leading and most often cited Utah

case holding that a restrictive employment covenant is valid and
enforceable when:

(1) it is supported by consideration, (2) no bad

faith is shown in the negotiation of the contract, (3) the covenant
is necessary to protect the good will of the employer and (4) it is
reasonable in its restrictions as to time and area. Id. at 828.

The

covenant at issue meets all of these requirements.
In~

by

defendant

Park, the plaintiff, a pharmacist, became employea

and

sometime

employment contract.

thereafter,

executed

a

restrictive

In the contract plaintiff agreed that, upon

termination of his employment, he would not compete with defendant
as an employee or principal in the operation of a drug store or
pharmacy, within a radius of two miles of defendant's drug store for
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a period of five years after termination of employment.
plaintiff

evidently

did

not

acquire

trade

secrets

While the
during

his

employment, the case noted that he had created a great deal of good
will for the employer's business.

Id.

at 824-27.

Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of the res tr icti ve covenant.

Notwithstanding

defendant's arguments of lack of consideration and mutuality due to
the terminable nature of the employment contract, and of inequity
and hardship, this Court held that the contract was supported by
consideration. This Court also determined that the employer, when it
hired the employee, also purchased the good will accruing to the
business by reason of the employee's personal attributes; therefore,
the employer was entitled to protect such interest by prohibiting
the employee, by covenant, from soliciting or enticing away customers or otherwise competing with the employer.

The following quota-

tions clarify and lend understanding to this Court's holding.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we believe that as long as
the restrictions as to time and space are reasonably
necessary to the protection of the business and the
hardship features of the case do not constitute equitable grounds for rescission, or call for the intervention of other rules of equitable relief, then the court
is powerless to relieve a party from the effects of his
contract.
Restrictive covenants are generally upheld by the
courts where they are necessary for the protection of
the business for the benefit of which the covenant was
made and no greater restraint is imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection.
[Citations
omitted]
Id. at 826.
If there is legal consideration given to support it, an
employer is equally entitled to the good will created
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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by his employee, as is the purchaser of an establishment
which includes the good will of the business.
In both
cases, when the individual responsible for creating the
good will and the business to which it attaches, become
separated, it is necessary to preserve that good will
to the business by a covenant on the part of the individual that he will not compete in an area where his personal reputation will detach the old customers from the
old business. We hold that a covenant is valid which
protects good will as well as trade secrets •
••• Therefore, we hold that a covenant not to compete
is necessary for the protection of the good will of the
business when it is shown that although the employee
learns no trade secrets, he may likely draw away customers from his former employer, if he were permitted to
compete nearby.
Id. at 827.
The majority opinion in Rose Park acknowledged that if the
employer had exercised bad faith in connection with the covenant,
intending employment to last merely long enough to bind the employee
to the covenant and prevent him from working elsewhere, the covenant
would not be enforceable.
despite

the

fact

No such bad faith was found, however,

that the employee had been terminated by the

employer.
This Court also found the Rose Park covenant reasonable

----

based upon Defendant's marketing area and upheld the trial court's
finding as to reasonableness of a five year time duration of the
restrictive covenant.
The

~

Park case was cited and followed by this Court in

Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 v. 155, 239 P.2d

745 (1952) in upholding an

injunction enforcing a lawful, necessary covenant not to compete,
on the grounds that such covenant and its means of enforcement by
injunction were agreed to in a bona fide.contract.
As reflected in the above statement of facts, Appellant and
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent entered into a continuing employment agreement supported
by the same consideration as the employment agreement in ~ Park.
The trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law
in this case clearly indicate that he followed the dissent and not
~Park

the binding law of the majority in

when he concluded that

the contract in question was one of adhesion working a hardship upon
Respondent.

Nevertheless, the dissent

in~

Park is not good or

binding law, and the law announced and established by the majority
opinion is applicable subject only to: (1) the agreement being supported by consideration, (2) there being no bad faith on Appellant's
part, (3) the restrictive covenant being necessary to protect the
good will of Appellant and (4) the covenant being reasonable with
respect to time and area.
satisfied

in

the

manner

Each of these conditions have been
necessary

to

uphold

the

restrictive

employment contract in this case.
Not even the trial court had any problem with there being
adequate consideration for the restrictive employment contract in
that it specifically found the existance of adequate consideration
(Transcript at 43-44).
Neither is there any showing of bad faith in this case when
Respondent worked for Appellant for approximately three years and
then herself voluntarily terminated her employment to work for
MetroData.
The Agreement specifically states that Respondent agreed
not

to

become

Organization."

employed

by

a

competitor,

a

"Conflicting

MetroData, by the uncontroverted testimony in the

lower Court (Transcript at 29-30), is a competitor of Appellant and
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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therefore a Conflicting Organization under the Agreement.

Such

restrictive employment agreement is necessary and designed to secure
to

the

employer

the

benefit

of

the

good

will

Appellant

has

purchased, created and developed in or through Respondent during the
period of her employment.
Through extensive promotions, advertisements and methods of
business,
sought

Appellant not only allowed development of but freely

to

develop

and

create

good

will

through

Respondent.

Appellant displayed Respondent's name and picture as its national
sales representative in advertisements of its products (Exh. 13),
which were specifically designed to project Appellant's good will
and the reputation of its products through Respondent.

Under the

majority opinion in Rose Park, Appellant is entitled to retain, protect, and preserve the benefits of that good will and reputation and
not to have the same transferred to Metrooata because Respondent is
now employed by it and

to be protected against Respondent and

Metrooata using such good will and reputation to Appellant's detriment in competition with it.
Furthermore, in this case, in addition to Appellant's good
will which should be protected by the relief sought here, there is
the distinct possibility of misappropriation and use of Appellant's
proprietary information by Respondent.

Respondent has admitted

access to Appellant's proprietary information and involvement with
the operational design specifications and technical development of
Appellant's

multi-channel

character

knowledge of customer needs.

generator

because

(Transcript at 44-45) •

of

her

Due to the

nature of her employment with Appellant, she was constantly exposed
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to

Appellant's

programs.

sales

leads,

clientele

and

marketing

data

and

These are Appellant's property which Respondent agreed to

protect and which should be and can only be protected by the injunction sought in this case.

Restatement 2d Agency

395, 396 (1958).

§§

Finally, the covenant at issue is reasonable as to time and
area under the standards set forth in

~

Park.

Testimony below

establishes that due to the nature of the cable television industry,
Appellant's market is nationwide (Transcript at 23).

This is also

evidenced by Respondent's work for both Appellant and MetroData as
"national sales manager".
time.

The covenant is also reasonable as to

Respondent was with Appellant and developing such good will

for a period of three years, and two years to consolidate such good
will and develop it in Respondent's replacement is reasonable.
II.
APPELLANT HAS MET ITS BURDEN FOR THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
SOUGHT.
Those grounds upon which injunctive relief may be granted
by Utah courts are as follows:
(e)
granted:

Grounds for Injunction.

An injunction may be

(1)
When it appears by the pleadings on file
that a party is entitled to the relief demanded,
and such relief, or any part thereof consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of some
act complained of, either for a limited period or
perpetually~

(2) When it appears from the pleadings or by
affidavit that the commission or continuance of some
act during the litigation would produce great or irrepairable injury to the party seeking injunctive
relief;
(3) When it appears during the litigation that
either party is doing or threatens, or is about to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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act in violation of the rights of another party respecting the subject matter of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual;
(4) In all other cases where
would be proper in equity.

an

injunction

U.R.C.P. 65A(e).
With respect to the first ground for injunctive relief that
it must appear

that the moving party is entitled to the relief

demanded, it is not necessary that the moving party's right appear
absolutely certain.

It is enough that a probable right is shown.

7-Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice ,65.04[1] at 65-39, ,65.04[4] at
65-67 (1980).

The reasons for such lesser showing are, inter alia,

that unless a full,

final hearing on the merits is held on the

request for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff may hold back evidence at the hearing for preliminary injunction, or have a case
which may not yet be fully developed.
supra, ,65.04[4] at 65-67.

Moore's Federal Practice,

Also, as was particularly the case in

this matter (Supra at P. 4 and Transcript 4), time constraints on a
hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction may preclude a full,
final hearing on the merits.
In order to protect one against whom a preliminary injunction is granted, security is required of the party in favor of whom
the injunction is granted.
(c) Security. Except as otherwise provided by
law, no restraining order or preliminary injunction
shall issue except upon the giving of security by
the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper,
for the payment of such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party who is found to
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
U. R. C. P. 6 SA ( c) •

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Not

only

is

Appellant

entitled

to protection

through

injunctive relief, but it is entitled to be protected in the form of
a preliminary injunction pending a final trial on the merits because
each of the three specific listed grounds for injunctive relief in
U.R.C.P. 65A{e), supra, have been satisfied.
First, Appellant has requested relief restraining the continuance of Respondent's employment with MetroData, and Appellant
has

shown probable entitlement to

its

requested relief at the

hearing on the motion for the preliminary injunction.

Appellant

obviously did not have time to introduce all of its currently
available evidence in the one hour and fifteen minute hearing, and,
in fact, does not yet have all its evidence because its case is not
fully

developed.

No

formal

discovery

has

yet

occurred.

Nevertheless, Appellant did show, based upon the Agreement and the
law above discussed, that success is probable, which is sufficient.
If not restrained,

the employment relationship between

Respondent and MetroData will continue during the pendency of this
action, and Respondent, as national sales manager for Appellant's
direct competitor, will be allowed to use Appellant's good will that
has attached to her and Appellant's proprietary information to
Appellant's detriment.

This satisfies the second stated ground for

injunctive relief that continuance of some act during the litigation
would produce great or irreparable injury.

It is obviously of great

intangible injury to have good will created by the time, expense and
effort of one party used in competition against that party.

Also,

because of the difficulties and speculation involved in proving that
any sale made by Respondent to a former customer of Appellant during
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the pendency of this action would otherwise have been obtained by
Appellant rather than MetroData, Appellant will have great difficulty in proving and therefore being compensated for monetary
damages incurred as a result of a preliminary injunction not being
in effect.
The third stated ground for injunctive relief, that an act
is threatened or is occurring which will tend to render a final
judgment ineffectual, is likewise satisfied.

Any final judgment

would not be able to effectively restore to Appellant the benefits
of its good will attached to Respondent or proprietary information
of Appellant used against and in competition with Appellant during
the pendency of the action.
In addition to Appellant having satisfied the requirements
for injunctive relief under the applicable Rule, it must be noted
that Respondent has specifically agreed and acknowledged in the
Agreement that injunctive relief is appropriate and may be awarded.
(Exh. 9).

Perhaps of most importance from a procedural standpoint,
any injury which may be suffered by Respondent as a result of a preliminary injunction can be provided for through the requirement that
security be posted by Appellant.

Appellant has been and is willing

to provide such security in an amount to be reasonably set by the
court.

However,

if

it

is

later

determined

that Appellant

is

entitled to relief, damages suffered by it during the pendency of
the action, which in all probability cannot be monetarily proven,
will be lost without protection to Appellant.

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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III. THE TRIAL COURTS ,FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE RECORD EVIDENCE DO
NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR ORDER.
The first conclusion of the trial court is stated thus:
1.
Issuance of a preliminary injunction at
this time would prohibit defendant Dixon from any
employment within the industry in which she is
trained, thus creating great hardship for defendant
Dixon. (Recorded at 54).
The

findings

of

the

trial

court

do

industry in which [Defendant Dixon] is trained."

not

specify

"the

It may be assumed

such is the sales industry and, if so, the restrictive covenant at
issue certainly does not prohibit Respondent's working in the sales
industry.
Even if the trial court's findings imply that the

industry

referred to is television equipment sales, the covenant at issue
does not prohibit Respondent's selling television equipment.

All

the covenant does is prohibit Respondent from rendering services to
a Conflicting Organization dealing in products, processes or services which resemble or compete with products, processes, or services

of Appellant

upon

or

with which Respondent

directly or

indirectly worked or about which she acquired confidential information.

(Exh.

9).

The agreement also states in Paragraph 6 that

under certain circumstances Respondent can work for a Conflicting
Organization.
support

the

There are no findings, testimony or other evidence to
breadth

of

the

stated

restriction on Respondent's

employment.
Consequently,

the

restrictive

covenant works

no great

hardship on Respondent; likewise there are no findings, evidence or
testimony in the record showing any hardship for Respondent.
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The second of the trial court's conclusions is stated thus:
2. The contract is a contract of adhesion and
because enforcement of it would create substantial
hardship to defendant Dixon, plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable remedy of a preliminary injunction.
(Record at 54).
Plaintiff again submits that there is nothing in the record
to support the conclusion of substantial hardship to Respondent.
Neither are there findings of fact, testimony or evidence to support
the conclusion of a contract of adhesion.

To the contrary, the

record indicates that Respondent's employment with Appellant was
always terminable at will, and the consideration for the Agreement
was Respondent's continued employment, promotion and raise.

The

trial judge specifically found such to be adequate consideration.
(Transcript at 43-44.)

Furthermore, no bad faith within the purview

of Rose Park was found: Respondent worked for Appellant for three
years and then voluntarily terminated her employment.
bad faith,

Absent such

such covenants have been enforced because they have

reasonable commercial purpose in protecting business good will and
proprietary

information

and

do

not,

absent

bad

faith,

work

hardship.
The third conclusion of the trial court is stated thus:
3.
Plaintiff has failed to meet the standards
of Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
governing issuance of a preliminary injunction.
(Recorded at 54) •
The standards of Rule 65A are not dealt with at all in the
findings.
based on

For the reasons set forth in Section II of this Argument
the

record evidence,

Plaintiff

has met the standards
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necessary to war ran~ this Court's reversal of the lower court's
denial of a preliminary injuction.

CONCLUSION
Enforcement by injunction of restrictive employee covenants
such as the one sought to be enforced here has previously been
allowed

by

this Court.

The

instant covenant

is . supported by

consideration; no bad faith has been shown in its negotiation; the
covenant is necessary to protect the good will of Appellant's business, as well as its proprietary information; and the covenant is
reasonably restrictive as to time and area in light of Appellant's
business

and marketing

area.

Therefore,

indistinguishable and fully governed by

the

~

instant

case

is

Park and its progeny.

As shown by the record evidence, Appellant has met its Rule
65A(e) burden of establishing grounds for a preliminary injunction.
Appellant, with time and evidence constraints notwithstanding, has.
shown probable success on the merits; Appellant, if Respondent's
employment is allowed to continue, will sufffer great and irreparable injury; any final judgment, due to Respondent's unlawful
competitive

employment,

cannot

restore

to

Appellant

damages

occassioned by the deprivation of its good will and proprietary
information.
The lower court's conclusions of law pursuant to which it
denied a preliminary injunction are not supported by its findings of
fact or testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing.

Therefore,

because Respondent can be protected by the
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liminary injunction and because Appellant cannot likewise be protected from denial of a preliminary injunction if later shown to be
entitled

to a permanent

injunction,

the

lower Court should be

reversed and directed to enter a preliminary injunction as requested
by Appellant.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of February, 1982.
PARSONS & CROWTHER

CERTIFICATzc::¥~ C

I hereby certify that I mailed,

(.-

pas~age pre~d,

two copies

of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Ellen Maycock, Kruze, Landa,
Zimmerman & Maycock, 620 Kearns Building, 136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah
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84101, Attorney for Respondent, this ~day

of February, 1982.
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